Narrative Value and Well-Being by Fu, Franchesca
Claremont Colleges 
Scholarship @ Claremont 
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship 
2021 
Narrative Value and Well-Being 
Franchesca Fu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fu, Franchesca, "Narrative Value and Well-Being" (2021). Scripps Senior Theses. 1611. 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1611 
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at 
Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized 

















SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 







PROFESSOR RIVKA WEINBERG 
 






APRIL 30, 2021 
 
 
Section I: Introduction 
When one looks back on one’s life, one can often construct a narrative out of the events 
in one’s life. One’s narrative could be a narrative of progress or a narrative of forgiveness or a 
narrative of deterioration. This idea that our narratives can be part of our lives is seen in 
everyday life. David Velleman formalizes this idea by arguing that one’s narrative can increase 
one’s well-being, which has implications for how we can increase our well-being. Should we 
seek out goods or undertake activities that could give us a better narrative? What narrative would 
increase our well-being? In order to answer those questions, in Section I, I explain that the 
concept of well-being involves one’s life going better or worse for the individual in question. 
Some philosophers think that one’s well-being increases when one obtains more objective goods, 
and one of those objective goods under debate is one’s narrative. Since Helena de Bres’s 
argument does not show that narratives by themselves increase one’s well-being, I turn to 
Velleman’s argument for narrative value where one’s narrative contributes to one’s well-being 
independently of the value already in one’s life. After relying on an intuitive understanding of 
narrative and surveying the literature on how one’s narrative can affect one’s well-being, in 
Section II, I clarify Connie Rosati’s account of what one’s narrative is by pointing out how it has 
an objective and subjective component. Moreover, I highlight worries with the account of 
narrative Rosati uses for how it assumes that there is a single narrative and that the individual is 
cognitively able to interpret the events in one’s life into a narrative. From thereon, I present 
Rosati’s argument that one’s narrative needs to be chosen or internalized, affirming, and make 
one’s failings nearly irrelevant to make a positive contribution to one’s well-being. I then add the 
necessary condition that a narrative needs to be true for it to increase one’s well-being. Finally, 
in Section III, after rejecting irreplaceability as necessary for a meaningful narrative, I draw from 
 
 
Antti Kauppinen’s account of a meaningful narrative to argue that meaning is necessary for a 
narrative to increase one’s well-being. 
Section IA: Background for the debate on well-being 
Most would grant that one’s life can go better or worse with regards to one’s well-being. 
For example, one’s life usually goes better when one has emotional support from others, and one 
is engaged with one’s hobbies, job, and activities. On the other hand, one’s life goes worse when 
one loses the relationships one has with others, loses one’s job, and is unable to partake in one’s 
hobbies, if one has any. The term well-being captures the idea of how well one’s life is going for 
the person in question and not for people outside of the subject (Kraut 1). If something is good 
for you, it maintains or increases your well-being or prevents your well-being from decreasing. 
When one person’s well-being increases after one nourishes herself, that does not mean that 
another person's well-being has also increased.  
When talking about well-being, well-being refers to the value in one’s life as opposed to 
the value of one’s life. This distinction has been made by Julie Tannenbaum, who explains that 
the value of one’s life assesses the moral status or moral worth of a person’s life (439). 
According to Kant, questions about one’s moral status are different from questions about what 
things make a person’s life good for her. Even if a person’s life has little well-being in it, the 
value that she has as a person does not change. Even in a life of poor quality, the individual’s 
rights should be respected, given that they have not been forfeited, overridden, or waived. The 
individual still should not be unduly killed. Value in a life refers to well-being in a way that is 
separate from questions about one’s moral status. 
There are several conceptions of well-being, and each has a different implication for what 
increases our well-being. Under a narrow hedonistic conception of well-being, pleasurable 
 
 
mental states are assigned a positive value given their duration, intensity, and number. Similarly, 
under this view of well-being, the painful mental states are assigned a negative number 
depending on their duration, intensity, and number. A life with less pain, stress, anger, hunger, 
boredom, etc. is better for one than a life with more such negative mental states (Benetar 71).  
Another theory of well-being is the desire-fulfillment theory of well-being. On this 
theory, one’s well-being increases if more desires are fulfilled and fewer desires are left 
frustrated (Parfit 494). The longer, more intense, greater quantity of desires that are fulfilled, the 
more one’s well-being is increased. When one wants a burger and gets the burger, one's well-
being increases. When one wants to become a parent and one becomes one, one’s well-being 
increases.  
A subjective conception of well-being can be contrasted with an objective conception of 
well-being. On this view, certain things are good and bad for people, regardless of what one 
believes or desires about those things. I’ll focus only on the objective goods, since these are what 
matters in what follows. An objective good is one that is intrinsically valuable and not merely 
instrumentally valuable (i.e. good only for something else). One's level of well-being is higher if 
one has more objective goods and fewer objective bads (499). How much objective goods 
increase one’s well-being depend on how many objective goods there are and their degree of 
goodness.  
There are different views about which things are objectively good for people. On the 
capabilities theory of well-being, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, capabilities 
and functionings of humans that contribute to human flourishing are what is objectively good 
(Sen 31). The capabilities refer to what one can do or achieve, and the functionings refer to the 
actualization of one’s capabilities, that is, what one actually manages to do (31). To illustrate the 
 
 
difference between capabilities and functionings, we can take the example of an exceptional 
track athlete who has the capability to run a five minute mile, even if she chooses not to, and so 
is not currently completing the mile run. When she runs the five minute mile, that is an example 
of one’s functioning.  
Martha Nussbaum further fills out the capabilities theory by specifying the relevant 
capabilities that increase one’s well-being, which are based on the distinctive characteristics of 
humans as a biological category. Sen and Nussbaum draw from Aristotle and claim that the 
relevant capabilities are those that are characteristic of humans and not of non-human entities, 
such as immortals or plants (Nussbaum 505). The relevant capabilities are distinctive of humans 
and pick out humans as a unique kind of thing. Even though the essential features of being fully 
human manifest in numerous ways, some of the shared features of being human include being 
mortal, having a body that requires food, water, and shelter, associating with other humans, 
having the capacity for pleasure and pain, having cognitive capabilities for perception, and 
having the capacity for practical reason, etc (508). Having those capabilities is the first, 
minimum threshold that makes for a human life (513). Beyond the bare minimum traits it takes 
to be human, there is a second, higher threshold of well-being where one has a flourishing human 
life when the threshold is met (513). Reaching the second threshold involves having the 
capability to have those aforementioned needs adequately met. The capabilities that are part of 
the second, higher threshold include being able to live to the end of a normal human life, being 
able to have good health, being able to think and reason, being able to form attachments with 
others, and being able to enjoy recreational activities, among others (516). So, on Sen and 
Nussbaum’s view, the more that a person has those aforementioned capabilities, the higher level 
of well-being that one has.  
 
 
An offshoot of these theories of well-being is a hybrid theory of well-being, which 
combines features from each of the theories of well-being. A hybrid theorist of well-being 
proposes that pleasure, fulfilled desires, objective goods are necessary, but not sufficient for 
having a good life (Parfit 502). So, if one were to only have pleasure, one would have a very low 
level of well-being. One account of a hybrid theory of well-being is Kagan’s view of “enjoying 
the good” (Kagan 253). He proposes that one’s life goes better if one takes pleasure in objective 
goods in virtue of the features that make the objective goods good (255).  
I am not taking a stand on whether objective list theories or hybrid theories are correct, 
but instead, I will assume that at least part of a person’s well-being is determined objectively, by 
which I mean that some things are good for a person regardless of the person’s beliefs and 
desires. I am also not taking a stand on whether Sen and Nussbaum are correct in claiming that 
capabilities or specific types of capabilities are objectively good. Instead, I want to focus on one 
proposal for an item on the objective list: one’s narrative. I will present de Bres’s and 
Velleman’s argument to show how one’s narrative can increase or decrease one’s well-being. 
From thereon, I will rely on Velleman’s argument that a person’s narrative can affect one’s well-
being and focus on the debate of what features of narrative are necessary to increase one’s well-
being. 
Section IB: Can one’s narrative affect one’s well-being? 
 Given that some objective goods can positively affect one’s well-being, one question is if 
one’s narrative can positively affect one’s well-being. Can one’s narrative be one of the things on 
the list of objective goods? In order to answer this question, I will first consider Helena de Bres’s 
claim that narratives that are true and adhere to a set of salient narrative conventions are 
valuable, since such narratives bring about the objective goods of understanding and community. 
 
 
This argument, however, does not show that such narratives are objective goods, which, recall, 
must have non-instrumental value in order to avoid the double-counting of objective goods. After 
dispelling de Bres’s argument, I turn to Velleman’s argument that one’s narrative itself can affect 
one’s well-being, which he argues for with two compelling examples. Finally, I conclude this 
section by replying to Brännmark’s disagreement with Velleman’s claim that momentary value 
exists.  
de Bres claims that one’s narrative that is true and usually, one’s narrative that adheres to 
a set of salient narrative conventions makes one’s life intelligible to oneself and others, which 
then brings about the goods of understanding and community (562). According to de Bres, 
narrative conventions are models for one’s narrative that have a predetermined structure and plot 
(557). Narrative conventions can include the themes and plots of romance, comedy, tragedy, and 
redemption where they then become salient if the narrative convention is “prevalent in a 
community for which the narrator has an affinity” (557; 562). Moreover, the community where 
the narrative is prevalent is conceived in a very general and broad way where it includes the 
“entire population of humans, past and present, or a subset living in a particular time or place” 
(562). Since narratives can be simplified into narrative conventions and can emphasize important 
events in one’s life, de Bres claims that narratives then make one’s life intelligible and gives one 
insight into one’s life. In essence, according to de Bres, most narratives will make one’s life 
intelligible to oneself and others.  
From thereon, de Bres argues that the intelligibility that one attains from true narratives 
that adhere to a set of narrative conventions brings about the goods of understanding and 
community, which then makes one’s life more meaningful. The good of understanding in part 
involves “‘making sense’ of complex matters, through apprehending the relationships between 
 
 
their elements or parts” (559). The good of having community involves having “companionship, 
cooperation, solidarity and love” (561). Those goods are seen as objective goods. Thus, her 
argument is that narratives that are true and adhere to a set of salient narrative conventions are 
instrumental to bringing about objective goods. She then claims that the objective goods of 
understanding and community that follow from true narratives that follow a set off salient 
narrative conventions are sufficient for a meaningful narrative. So, the first part of her argument 
can be directly applied to how narratives can increase one’s well-being, as one could say that if 
one has more objective goods, then one’s well-being has increased.  
One issue with this view that true narratives that accord to a set of salient narrative 
conventions make for meaningful narratives is that it is both overly inclusive and overly 
exclusive. Intuitively, a narrative of carelessness and disregard is not meaningful, even if it is 
true and adheres to a set of narrative conventions. A narrative where one acts immorally, 
squanders one’s successes, and ruins one’s relationships yet feels connected to that community is 
intuitively not meaningful. Additionally, this view does not include narratives that are intuitively 
meaningful, such as if one holds a narrative that is not prevalent in the community one has an 
affinity for. For example, we can imagine a community that values a narrative of honor and 
gaining power while an individual holds a narrative that involves accepting and forgiving others, 
and the individual’s narrative is not respected by others. In this scenario, the individual feels 
connected to the community that values a narrative of attaining power and rejects other 
communities that value other narratives. Intuitively, the individual’s narrative is meaningful, 
even if the individual does not feel aligned with the community that the narrative is prevalent in. 
However, de Bres’s view excludes that narrative as being meaningful. 
 
 
Moreover, for something to be one of the things on the list of objective goods, the thing 
needs to by itself, independently of what it brings about, increase one’s well-being such that the 
list of objective goods avoids double-counting objective goods. If the objective list of goods 
contained merely instrumental goods, there would be double-counting of things that are 
objectively good. We can imagine that one’s life only contains a merely instrumental good, such 
as money. That life would not have anything of value in it yet. However, when the merely 
instrumental good brings about an intrinsic good, such as if one buys sustenance, then the life has 
something valuable in it. However, in that life, there is only one objectively good thing in it– the 
sustenance. de Bres’s argument does not give reasons for how narrative directly or by itself could 
increase one’s well-being. Rather, de Bres’s argument makes causal claims that show what 
narratives can bring about. According to de Bres’s argument, one’s narrative would lose its value 
if the goods of community and understanding were not attained. de Bres argues that community 
and understanding are things that by themselves increase one’s well-being and not narratives. 
In contrast with de Bres, Velleman argues that narratives directly impact one’s well-
being. To show that the narrative of one’s life can impact one’s well-being, Velleman first 
distinguishes well-being of the whole from well-being at a given time. Well-being at a given 
time, also known as momentary well-being, refers to how well an individual’s life goes at a 
moment in time (according to whichever theory of well-being one favors or holds) (48). For 
example, momentary well-being measures one’s well-being when one is 20 years old. This 
snapshot of well-being is unlike one’s well-being as a whole. The well-being over one’s life as a 
whole takes into account how things went as a whole. This type of well-being measures how 
well one’s life as a whole went from years 0 to 20. Even if there are bad moments in one’s life, 
one’s life as a whole can still have a high level of well-being. On many theories of well-being, 
 
 
such as hedonistic theory and objective list theory, how well one’s life is going (or went) at a 
given time does not depend on what comes before or after it. Before Velleman argues for 
narrative value, Velleman sketches out two compatible ways of assessing one’s well-being; one 
can increase one’s momentary well-being and/ or one’s well-being as a whole.  
Velleman claims that these two ways of assessing well-being are connected in that the 
total value in the whole depends not only on the sum of the value of the moments of well-being 
but also on the metaphysical relations of the parts (48). In other words, the well-being as a whole 
or value in the whole depends in part on the connection between the parts of one’s life. The total 
value in one’s life could depend on how well each year went and if those years improve, how 
those years built on past years. For Velleman, even if the well-being of the whole and total well-
being of the moments are equal to each other, their equivalence would only be an accident, since 
the well-being of a whole should not be determined by summing up the well-being of the parts, 
and the well-being of the moments should not determined by dividing the well-being of the 
whole (49).  
To argue that one’s narrative can affect one’s well-being as a whole, Velleman presents 
an argument that has two main steps. Velleman first provides two examples of two lives with 
equal amounts of momentary value, and yet intuitively one life has gone better than the other. He 
then argues that the difference in how the two lives went overall or as a whole is best explained 
by the different narratives of the two people’s lives. While a bad narrative can contribute 
negatively to one’s well-being, Velleman and I will focus on how one’s narrative can increase 
one’s well-being. 
When assessing the well-being of one’s entire life, Velleman rejects that the mere sum of 
momentary well-being adequately captures the well-being of one’s life by presenting examples 
 
 
of two lives. In one life, the individual’s life starts off well; she has a comfortable, happy 
childhood (49). However, in the middle of her life, she is the victim of bad luck and she finishes 
the second half of her life poorly (49). For the second life, the opposite is the case. She starts 
with a rough childhood, midway through, her fortune reverses through good luck, and she ends 
her life comfortably and happily (50). We can assign a numerical value to well-being at a given 
time and then add all the values over the lifetime. The numerical value of each moment of well-
being is such that when all the values of the moments are added, the two lives come to the same 
sum total, as depicted in the figure below.  
 
Even though these two lives are of equal momentary value, intuitively, the latter life has a 
greater level of well-being as a whole (50). This example shows that what is good for one can 
increase the momentary value in one’s life without improving the overall well-being in one’s 
life. Thus, the well-being of the whole does not need to equal the well-being of the sum of its 
parts. The well-being can be more or less than the sum of its parts given the relations between 
the moments.  
Another example that shows that how well a life went as a whole can be more than the 
sum of the well-being of the moments is Velleman’s example of two politicians. We can imagine 
that there are two politicians who are both working hard and trying to get elected (53). However, 
 
 
politician A wins the race while politician B loses the race but instead wins the lottery. With 
these two lives, we can assign numerical values to the well-being of the moments and after 
assigning numerical values to the well-being at a moment and adding all the values over one’s 
life, the two politicians trying to get elected have the same sum total value of momentary well-
being (53). Despite the fact that politician B lost the race, her momentary well-being is equal to 
politician A’s, because winning the lottery increases her well-being. The equal amounts of 
momentary well-being and the shape of the lives are depicted in the following graphs. 
 Even though these two lives have equal amounts of momentary well-being due to 
different circumstances, intuitively, the winning politician’s life has gone better than the 
politician’s life that lost the race but won the lottery. 
To argue for narrative value, Velleman argues that the only relevant candidates to explain 
the difference in sum total amount of well-being in A vs. B’s lives are the timing of events and 
the value of one’s narrative. I propose that the value of agency can explain the difference in 
value in the example of the two politicians. The timing of events could explain the difference in 
well-being in the first example of the two lives, if one holds a principle that there is additional 
value when one’s well-being increases later in one’s life. Velleman actually denies that the 
timing of events can even explain the difference in value of the first example of two lives with 
opposite trajectories. While the difference in well-being could potentially be explained by the 
timing of events in the first example of two lives, it cannot explain the difference in total value in 
 
 
the example of the two politicians’ lives (53). The timing of events refers to at what point in 
one’s life when one’s well-being is high or low. If the timing of events were to explain the 
difference in the sum total amount of well-being for the two politicians, then the timing of events 
must be different. However, the increase in well-being in the politicians’ lives occurs at the same 
time; one politician gets elected the same time that the other politician wins the lottery (53). So, 
the timing of events is the same in the two politician’s lives and cannot explain the difference in 
the well-being of the whole of the two lives.  
Another candidate that could explain the difference in overall well-being of the two 
politician’s lives is the value of agency. Increasing one’s well-being through exercising one’s 
agency has greater value than increasing one’s well-being due to non-agency. In the case of the 
two politicians, one politician’s well-being increases when she uses her agency to successfully 
win her election, and the other politician’s increase in well-being depends primarily on external 
factors or the person picking the lottery ticket. So, the example of the two politicians does not 
capture all the value that is present; one life has more well-being from having one’s well-being 
increase come from one’s agency. Additionally, in order for agency to be an alternative form of 
value in these example lives, agency needs to be distinct from a narrative. While having a 
narrative may require that one have agency, they are still distinct concepts in that agency refers 
to exercising one’s capacity to act while a narrative is a representation of events. So, there is an 
alternative explanation for why one politician’s life is better than the other.  
Ultimately, Velleman argues that narrative value is what best explains the differences and 
not the timing of events or any other factor, since it can explain the difference in well-being in 
both examples. Narrative value refers to the value that the narrative of a person’s life contributes 
to the person’s well-being (60). The narrative of one’s life can add or detract to the overall well-
 
 
being of one’s entire life independently of how it affects one’s momentary well-being (60). In the 
lives of two individuals where the trajectories are opposites, the life that ends well tells a story of 
improvement while the life that ends badly tells a story of deterioration (50). And the story of 
improvement is a better narrative than a story of deterioration. For the two politicians, the 
winning politician’s well-being as a whole is higher, because it is a story of success (53). She 
accomplishes her goal of winning the election. For the other politician, despite the good the 
lottery win brought, her story is still a story of failure, since she loses her political race.  
Moreover, Velleman’s principle that narrative value can increase one’s well-being unifies 
and explains the two cases above. It is a better explanation than the other candidates presented, 
because we should accept a principle that has a unified explanation for all the examples over an 
explanation that can only explain one example or is not unified. Thus, what best explains the 
difference in how the two lives went as a whole is the different narratives. Through examples, 
Velleman argues that narrative value can affect one’s well-being as a whole. 
You’ll recall that one of Velleman’s claims is that on many theories of well-being, such 
as a hedonistic theory or objective list theory of well-being, how well one’s life is going (or 
went) at a given time does not depend on what comes before or after it. Namely, there is such a 
thing as momentary value, and that is crucial to the first step of his argument where one’s well-
being as whole can be different from the well-being of the moments. Interestingly, Brännmark 
denies that there is such a thing as how well each moment in one’s life is going. According to 
Brännmark, it is a mistake to think that certain moments are more valuable than others. Instead, 
those “statements are about the importance of [those moments] in making the life in question 
good” (325). He “den[ies] that there are such things as self-contained momentary instances of 
well-being to begin with” (Brännmark 326). The value of the whole is not based on the sum of 
 
 
the value of each moment of well-being, nor is the value of each moment of well-being derived 
from the value of the whole life of which it is part of. While Brännmark agrees with Velleman’s 
conclusion that one’s narrative can affect one’s well-being, he diverges from Velleman in that he 
does not agree with Velleman’s thought experiment that two lives with equal amounts of 
momentary well-being can have different total values.  
He provides an analogy to demonstrate his claim where he compares the total value in 
one’s life and momentary well-being as analogous in all relevant respects to the total value of a 
book and the value of its chapters. Brännmark claims that the value of a whole book is not the 
sum of the value of the chapters, and the value of the chapters is not derived from the value of 
the book as a whole (325). So, according to Brännmark, the chapters do not have their own 
independent value, and there is no such thing as momentary value. Brännmark rejects 
Velleman’s argument for narrative value on the basis that there is no momentary value and 
hence, the examples of the two lives with different total values but same amounts of momentary 
well-being in their lives cannot be appealed to.  
Nonetheless, in my view, the value of the parts can be determined separately from the 
value of the whole. While Brännmark concedes that one can “identify the qualitative peaks” in a 
book, he claims that one “can hardly say much more about them than that they are important in 
making the book as good as it is” (325). However, I think it is clear that we can say much more 
than he allows. Even when we do not know the value of the whole book or what even happens 
after the halfway mark, we can divide the book into its diction, characters, plots, and so on. 
Then, we can assign value to those parts, such as by judging the descriptiveness of the word 
choice, how well the characters have been developed, and how well the plot ties together the 
events so far. Moreover, some parts of a book are better than the other parts, such as if the book 
 
 
drags on towards the middle. And this can be determined before one has reached the end of the 
book and without knowing how all the chapters tie together. So, Brännmark should not reject 
Velleman’s thought experiment for narrative value, which depends on the existence of 
momentary value, since the value of the parts and the whole can be talked about separately and 
even before the value of the whole is present.   
Given Velleman's compelling argument that a person’s narrative can affect a person’s 
well-being, I will analyze how the narrative of a person’s life plays into one’s well-being. 
Exploring the connection between narrative and well-being will be done in part by answering the 
question of what features of a narrative are necessary to make a positive contribution to one’s 
well-being? 
Section IIA: What is one’s narrative according to Rosati? 
 When Velleman argues for narrative value, he does not define what a narrative is and 
may have thought that what one’s narrative is obvious. Unlike Velleman, Rosati indicates that a 
narrative is a representation of the events in one’s life from the individual's perspective. After 
providing her description, I raise some concerns with her view of what a narrative is.  
One view of one’s narrative, which is held by Rosati, is that one’s narrative is a 
representation of the events in one’s life through the point of view of the person whose life it is 
(Rosati 33). An example of one’s narrative is a life story, where one’s life story can include the 
series of major life events and how those events happened, such as milestones reached, 
relationships formed and lost, and the development of one’s personality traits.  
According to Rosati, one’s narrative has an objective component, which consists of the 
events and the relations among the events. One’s narrative is objectively determined by the 
events or what actually happened, since one “cannot interpret events in just any way we like” 
 
 
(39). For instance, if one has only lived in Los Angeles, one’s narrative cannot involve living in 
San Francisco, since that is something that did not happen. The second objective component of 
one’s narrative is the relations among events, such as the timing of events and the “underlying 
causal connections” (39). Those two components together have been described as the plot of a 
narrative by Antti Kauppinen, who draws the idea of plot from Aristotle (358). When Velleman 
refers to narratives, he focuses on the objective component of one’s narrative, such as the events 
and the relations between those events. The narrative of the politician that wins her race depends 
on whether or not she wins the race and the events that precede and succeed the win (Velleman 
60). However, Rosati adds to the discussion on narrative by pointing out that there is more to a 
narrative than the events and their relations. 
Rosati’s account of narrative also has a subjective component. One’s narrative can also 
depend in part on the narrator’s interpretation of those events. Rosati writes that “it seems we can 
make different things of [the events]” (39). Additionally, the subjective aspect of one’s narrative 
need not be verbal or expressed to others; it can mean thinking about one’s life in a narrative 
manner (34). Presumably, Rosati would agree with the example that when one fails to convert 
one’s artistic passions into a career, one’s narrative is constrained by that event, which is the 
objective aspect of one’s narrative. It is then impossible for one’s narrative to involve having a 
successful career based on one’s artistic interests. However, one’s narrative can be interpreted 
such that the failed career can be seen as an example of when one tried her best or seen as part of 
one’s journey of expanding one’s abilities. One’s interpretation of the events can alter one’s 
narrative.  
Given that one’s narrative depends in part on one’s interpretation, the way that one 
interprets the events can originate either internally from within oneself or from an external 
 
 
perspective (39). When one’s narrative originates internally, the narrative is a story that stems 
from the person in question, and that narrative is believed by the person. Even if the narrative 
comes from a third person perspective, what makes one’s narrative one’s own is that the 
narrative is adopted or believed by the individual (47). Sometimes, a friend tells an individual 
that her life has not been a failure and that she has overcome lots of hardships, and the individual 
comes to see her narrative that way. Because the new narrative has been internalized by the 
individual, the narrative is the individual’s own narrative, given that it is true to the events in the 
individual’s life. So, according to Rosati, the perspective of the subject, rather than an observer, 
determines what the narrative is.  
Although there are objective and subjective components to the account of narrative 
Rosati uses, one issue is that this account does not restrict the number of narratives a person 
could have. One’s life can have multiple narratives, and Rosati acknowledges that “we can tell 
more than one such story” (39). The individual can interpret the events in their life one way one 
day, and another way the next day, or in a few years. When one feels anxious, one may see one’s 
narrative as one of failure. However, when one feels well-rested or is having a good day, one 
may see one’s narrative as one of progress or success. Even though it is possible that individuals 
have multiple narratives, for simplicity’s sake, Rosati speaks as if there is a single narrative for a 
given person. When Rosati gives the example of fictitious William Stoner’s narrative, Stoner 
ultimately only adopts one narrative of his life– the narrative that reduces his failures (43). Even 
though Rosati provides multiple interpretations of Stoner’s narrative, only one narrative is 
adopted (44). So, Rosati focuses on one narrative in a person’s life and assumes that one’s  
narrative is maintained. While it is possible to evaluate how multiple narratives might contribute 
to one’s well-being, I will focus on evaluating how a single narrative contributes to one’s well-
 
 
being. So, for ease of the rest of this thesis, I will continue to speak if there is only a single 
narrative of a life. 
Another concern with Rosati’s account of narrative is that it assumes that the individual is 
cognitively able to recount and interpret the events in one’s life into a narrative. If a narrative 
partially depends on one’s interpretation, one needs to have self-awareness about one’s role in a 
situation, be able to remember past events, and be able to make connections between causally 
connected events. Moreover, one may also need imagination to conceive of other ways of 
interpreting the events in one’s life and practical reason to choose between different narratives. 
However, this account of what a narrative is leaves out those who do not have the cognitive 
capacity to form a narrative as well as those who do not think of their lives in terms of narrative. 
Notably, Galen Strawson, who shares a similar understanding of one’s narrative as Rosati, has 
rejected the psychological claim that humans think of their lives in terms of narrative, since he 
“does not figure [himself], considered as a self, as something that was there in the (further) past 
and will be there in the (further) future” (Srawson 430). In other words, he does not see past 
events as being part of himself and thus, does not connect the events and their relations together, 
as is necessary for one to have a narrative. So, one’s narrative may not be as subjective as Rosati 
conceives it to be. Even though Rosati’s account of narrative has its limitations, there are still 
people who are able to and do interpret their lives through narrative. So, I will focus on those 
who have formed narratives about their lives in order to evaluate Rosati’s claim, which is about 
how an interpreted narrative could increase one’s well-being.  
 
 
Section IIB: Rosati’s sufficient conditions for one’s narrative to contribute positively to one’s 
well-being 
Instead of using the terminology of “narrative,” Rosati uses the term "storytelling.” While 
storytelling is an activity that involves constructing and recounting one’s story, the story, or 
narrative, is the product of constructing one’s own life story. This interpretation of Rosati’s use 
of storytelling comes from how Rosati explains that it is “the effects of recounting to ourselves 
stories” that can increase one’s well-being (43). She also cautions against exaggerating how 
“consciously or how deliberately we engage in storytelling about our lives,” as it maybe that 
“some of us engage in little storytelling if any” (44). Nonetheless, Rosati seems to use the two 
terms interchangeably, and I will focus on Rosati’s argument that involves narrative, the product 
or creation of storytelling. Hence, I will also use the terms “storytelling” and “narrative” 
interchangeably. 
In this section, I will first lay out Rosati’s view that storytelling that is internalized or 
chosen, affirming, and makes one’s failures less relevant is both necessary and sufficient to 
increase one’s well-being. However, on Rossati’s own criteria for increasing well-being, story-
telling with these features is not always sufficient to increase one’s well-being, which is shown 
with the example of Alcoholics Anonymous. Moreover, I show that even on a non-technical, or 
intuitive understanding, of well-being, storytelling that has these three features she describes 
does not always increase one’s well-being. What we learn from my critique is that storytelling 
that increases one’s well-being must be true.  
For Rosati, a certain kind of storytelling empowers the individual to increase one’s well-
being. Regardless of where the story originates, the story needs to be (a) chosen or internalized, 
(b) affirming from one’s own point of view, and (c) make one’s own failings less relevant in 
 
 
order to positively affect one’s well-being. A positive story about oneself can be told in part by 
“making one’s failings nearly irrelevant” (47; 45). Making one’s failings nearly irrelevant can be 
better represented by the idea of making one’s failings less relevant or central to one’s story. To 
make one’s failings irrelevant does not mean to ignore the failings or to believe that they did not 
happen, since it is not possible for storytelling to reverse events that did happen (46). Rather, 
making one’s failings less relevant involves reinterpreting the events that did happen to place 
them in a larger story that is not defined by deficiencies (46). Instead of focusing on one’s 
shortcomings, one can focus on another aspect of one’s story. For example, a series of failures 
can be made less relevant by accepting that the failures happened and seeing those failures as 
part of a story of persistence. 
 Not only should storytelling reduce the role of one’s failures, the type of storytelling that 
improves one’s well-being involves taking up and internalizing an affirming story. According to 
Rosati, when one’s story is taken up and internalized; it becomes one’s own (47). Not only does 
the story need to be chosen or internalized, it has to be affirming by supporting one’s self-worth 
for the story to increase one’s well-being. Rosati gives an example of what affirmative 
storytelling involves with a person who is going through a difficult time and tells a story of 
herself as a failure. A supportive, caring listener or friend would try to get the person to 
emphasize the parts of her story that highlight her successes, positive character traits, or unique 
features until that story is embraced by the friend (46). By retelling and reinterpreting one’s life’s 
events, one can resonate more with an affirming story about one’s life (46). To fill out Rosati’s 
view, beyond the failures in one’s life, other negative aspects of one’s life that can be 
reinterpreted by storytelling include misfortunes and feeling unsatisfied with one’s life.  For 
instance, some of those events could become stories of forgiveness or redemption.  
 
 
Rosati then uses the example of the fictional William Stoner to show that he engages in 
the kind of storytelling that increases one’s well-being. William Stoner was raised on a farm in 
rural Missouri and attends college with the intention of studying agriculture to help his family’s 
farm (40). However, upon taking an English class, he becomes enamored with literature and 
eventually completes a Ph.D. in it. After his graduate studies, he becomes a professor, has an 
unsuccessful marriage, his relationship with his daughter deteriorates, and he publishes a book to 
mixed results. Towards the end of his life, he is essentially demoted after a dispute with his 
colleague. However, he also develops a loving relationship with one of his graduate students. In 
essence, Stoner’s life was mixed; while his life has some good and successes, such as a 
consistent love of literature, his life also consists of failure and could have been better (39).  
However, what is notable about Stoner’s life is the interpretation of the events in his life. 
At the end of his life, he recounts his life to himself. There, he considers the view that his life 
was a failure; to an outsider, his life consists of failed loves and a rocky career (21). Yet, he 
ultimately rejects the picture of himself as a failure and instead, chooses to see himself and his 
life as defined by his persistence and faithfulness to literature (42).Without being prompted by 
anyone, after self-reflection, and under a calm state of mind, Stoner freely adopts the narrative of 
loving literature. Another story that resonates with Stoner and supports his own worth was 
chosen. He explains that the outward perception of his narrative as one of failure is “mean, 
unworthy of what his life had been” (21). So, he sees his life in a more positive light and sees 
himself as deserving of love, regardless of what happened in his life. He feels “himself at last 
beginning to be a teacher” and as a “man to whom his book is true” (42). Discovering one’s 
value as a person and one’s value to other people is affirming. Even if he cannot change past 
events, the narrative Stoner adopts minimizes his unsuccessful relationships and rocky career 
 
 
into a larger narrative of persistence and dedication to literature. So, Rosati shows that Stoner’s 
storytelling is chosen, supports his worth, and diminishes the importance of his failures, which 
then increases his well-being. 
When storytelling is internalized and affirmative, storytelling will increase one’s well-
being through Rosati’s account of well-being, which involves, in part, empowering the 
individual and bringing about internal motivation. Rosati claims, but does not defend, that an 
activity, project, relationship, or one’s narrative can increase one’s well-being if: 
“First, when a person is so related to a thing—an activity, an undertaking, another 
being—her engagement with that thing tends to support her sense of her own worth or 
value, which is not to be confused with those feelings of self-esteem that arise from her 
accomplishments or her manifestation of excellences. Second, it tends to be enlivening 
rather than enervating. Third, it tends to provide an important component of her identity 
and a sense of direction in life and so to contribute to her self- understanding. And 
finally, it provides a source of internal motivation. Being good for a person, I have 
claimed, just is being productive of these features” (Rosati 45). 
 
In sum, Rosati has five conditions that can be extrapolated from the quote above, which are 
necessary and together sufficient for something to increase one’s well-being. In other words, if 
something (1) helps one see one’s worth or value as an agent (2) shapes or expresses one’s 
identity (3) gives one a sense of direction in life (4) energizes one (5) provides motivation, then 
X increases one’s well-being. Rosati assumes that those conditions are self-explanatory, and I 
will do the same. In my view, the increase in well-being that comes from seeing one’s worth and 
feeling energized is compatible with increasing the momentary value in one’s life as well as 
increasing one’s well-being over one’s whole life, since the narrative relations between the 
moments do not necessarily play a role. In essence, Rosati claims that one’s well-being increases 
when the above five conditions are met.  
 
 
While Rosati assumes that such storytelling meets all the conditions to increase one’s 
well-being, I argue that the way that storytelling increases one’s well-being can happen without 
necessarily being energizing or motivating. Even when storytelling is chosen, affirming, and 
makes one’s failings nearly irrelevant, storytelling is not necessarily energizing or motivating. 
On Rosati’s account of well-being, there are five ways storytelling can increase one’s well-being. 
However, only seeing one’s worth, shaping or expressing one’s identity, and giving one a sense 
of direction are needed for storytelling to increase one’s well-being.  
The more limited set of conditions to increase one’s well-being are met in the case of 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and the example was provided by Rivka Weinberg. 
When one attends a closed AA meeting, members acknowledge that they are alcoholics and talk 
about their experience with alcohol use. In AA’s Twelve Steps to stop drinking, some of the 
tenets involve members admitting that they are powerless over alcohol, detailing how they have 
harmed other people through their drinking, making amends to those that they have harmed, and 
believing in the help of a greater power (“Alcoholics Anonymous”). So, the narrative of someone 
who attends AA meetings involves being an alcoholic, whose drinking has hurt oneself or other 
people. Also part of one’s AA narrative is that when one drinks, one cannot control how much 
one drinks, and that one is part of a community of alcoholics.  
Even though the case of attending AA meetings can increase one’s well-being, attending 
AA meetings does not always energize or provide one with internal motivation. Thinking about 
and being reminded of one’s AA narrative is emotionally draining, since it brings to mind the 
harm that one’s drinking has done. Part of going through AA involves acknowledging how one 
has hurt another person through drinking. It can be draining to see how one’s life falls short 
whether by luck or one’s own doing. For example, in a story of forgiveness, being forgiven does 
 
 
not undo the hurt one previously caused and is not something for one to forget. Over time, the 
thought of one’s narrative may be less draining, but one’s narrative still primarily involves one’s 
struggle to manage drinking with control, so the thought of one’s narrative still is not easy to 
think about or energizing.  
Not only can the narrative itself not be energizing, the process of forming one’s story or 
storytelling can also be draining not only for bringing to mind the harm drinking has done but 
also from trying to understand one’s real motivations (and not rationalizations) and 
vulnerabilities that lead one to drink. In a life of hardship and trauma, sometimes writing or 
recounting one’s story involves a bitter understanding of life’s shortcomings in a way that is not 
internally motivating, energizing, or affirming yet still increases one’s well-being. For memoirist 
Mary Karr, she explains that the process of writing about her life and looking back, “exposed the 
schism between who I’d wanted to be and who I’d actually been” even as she claims that her 
own narrative “has some magic power” (175).  
Moreover, the AA narrative is not internally motivating. The narrative of someone who 
attends AA meetings does make one more internally motivated to not drink, but does not 
necessarily make one feel more internally motivated to continue doing one’s everyday tasks, 
since there is risk of feeling the urge and being provoked to drink again. To see how one has 
failed and hurt another person can lead one to feel worse about what one has done in the past. 
One might not want to continue acting in the face of what harm one has done in the past, and 
thus the narrative is not internally motivating. So, Rosati’s account of how storytelling increases 
one’s well-being is unnecessarily limited to one’s successes and positive traits. Storytelling about 
one’s narrative increases one’s well-being even when that story does not leave one motivated, 
 
 
energized, or affirmed so long as it contributes to one’s identity, allows one to see one’s worth, 
and gives one direction. 
While Rosati’s form of storytelling seems to be entirely subjective, she claims that 
retinterpreting one’s story is not the same as telling a false story and that a false story would not 
allow for a stable increase in one’s well-being. She argues that in the example of Stoner, his 
storytelling is able to increase his well-being, because it is still constrained by the facts and 
events in his life (48). Stoner does not think that his failings and misfortune did not happen. For 
Rosati, a true story is important, because an untruthful story of one’s life would not be able to be 
maintained for a long period of time and would eventually lead to more disappointment and 
disillusionment with oneself (48).  
While Rosati briefly puts out that false storytelling about one’s life would not improve 
one’s well-being, her reasons for rejecting false storytelling do not hold up. In many cases, false 
stories have been held up over long periods of time, because some of those people have fully 
inhabited the false story such that they do not see the falsity or have the need to confront the 
falsity until the falsity is exposed by others. For example, in the case of writer Hache Carillo, 
only after he passed away did people outside of his immediate family, such as his husband, 
discover that he was not Cuban American as he had claimed, but that he was African American 
and was born with the last name of Carroll (Page). With his created Cuban identity, he often 
wrote about the Cuban American experience. The example of Hache Carillo and others show that 
false narratives can be maintained over long periods of time.  
Nonetheless, I claim that truth is a constraint or necessary condition on the kind of 
storytelling that can increase one’s well-being. We can take the example of an individual who 
has the narrative that one is the victim and that everyone around the individual is the problem, 
 
 
which then causes the individual to lash out at others around the individual. This narrative is 
false, since even though others around the individual may have accidentally harmed or 
inconvenienced the individual, the responsibility of others in causing problems in the individual's 
life is overblown by the individual. The individual does not adequately consider one’s role in 
facilitating the events that happen. In such a case, the narrative that is false may be comforting to 
the individual and allow the individual to avoid taking responsibility, but it does not increase the 
individual’s well-being overall. As long as the narrative is held by the individual, there will be 
cognitive dissonance in that the individual will not be able to adequately account for why one 
feels slighted, and one will encounter evidence that one is the problem in one’s relationships. 
Additionally, one’s narrative needs to be consistent to increase one’s well-being. Had 
Stoner’s narrative oscillated to be one of failure one day and one of resilience the next day, the 
narrative would not increase his well-being. A narrative that changes constantly does not help 
one interpret future events that happens. If one holds a narrative of resilience and one encounters 
a setback, that event would be seen as one small hardship in a larger narrative of persistence. 
However, if one holds a narrative of decline and one encounters a setback, the setback would be 
seen as another example of one’s decline. A narrative that changes constantly does not 
adequately interpret the events in one’s life and does not increase one’s well-being. 
Section III: Meaning as a necessary condition for one’s narrative to contribute positively to one’s 
well-being 
 In this section, I aim to show that a narrative must be meaningful in order to positively 
contribute to the person’s well-being. My account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
narrative to be meaningful (that is, for something to make a narrative meaningful) partly draws 
 
 
on Kauppinen’s account, and I’ll begin first by briefly specifying what meaningfulness involves, 
which has three “meanings” about the purpose, intelligibility, and significance of one’s life.  
When talking about life being meaningful, which is something that is intrinsically 
valuable, I am referring to the meaning in a life as opposed to the meaning of life. When talking 
about meaningfulness, I am referring to the meaningfulness in one’s life where that refers to the 
meaning in an individual person’s life and not meaning for the existence of humans or humans as 
a species. This distinction has been referenced by Thomas Metz (Metz 3).  
One account of the concept of meaningfulness is about life being purposeful. Metz 
explains that "the concept of a meaningful life is that of an existence that plays a role in the 
realization of valuable ends, even if that role is not to will them into being" (24). In other words, 
a purposeful life, and consequently a meaningful life, involves bringing about valuable ends. 
Meaningfulness as purpose is connected to questions like: what is the point of one’s life? One’s 
purpose can come from many sources, such as by fulfilling God’s will or by conducting 
scientific research or raising a family. One’s purpose can be supernatural or non-supernatural.  
Another account of the concept of life being meaningful is when one’s life has 
significance. On this view, when one’s life is meaningful, one is “connect[ed] with something 
valuable for its own sake beyond one’s person” (28). One must be connected to intrinsically 
valuable goods that are beyond one’s animal self, which include the goods necessary for survival 
and pleasure (29). For instance, doing something significant could mean having a conversation 
with a close friend about one’s values while doing something insignificant might involve making 
mindless chit chat about the weather with a stranger.  
Another sense of meaningfulness involves one’s life being intelligible. When one’s life is 
intelligible, it is understandable, since there is “existentially relevant information… in our 
 
 
understanding of the universe we inhabit” (Goetz and Seachris 9). When one wonders about 
life’s intelligibility, one question one asks is: how does my life fit in with the greater scheme of 
things? This concept of meaningfulness is analogous to how a piece of a puzzle is intelligible 
when it fits with the rest of a puzzle.  
While I do not take a stand on these concepts of meaningfulness, the concept of 
meaningfulness informs Kauppinen’s criterion for meaningful narrative. The criterion for a 
project to make one’s narrative meaningful are as follows: 
“A central project contributes to the meaningfulness of a chapter [in one’s life] to the 
degree that a) the goal is interpersonally or objectively valuable, b) the agent adopts the 
goal as her own, is irreplaceable, and exercises her essential human capacities in pursuing 
it, and c) the agent is successful in reaching the goal and is positively changed by this” 
(364). 
It is clear from this quote, and Kauppinen never says otherwise, that he thinks that projects must 
be objectively valuable or valuable to others, one’s own, use one’s human capacities to achieve 
the goal, positively change the agent, and one’s role in the project must be irreplaceable for one’s 
narrative to be meaningful. Despite mentioning success in the quote above, he wavers on the 
question of whether the success of a project is necessary for a meaningful narrative. Elsewhere, 
he says that “reaching the goal is not always the only important thing, since “in some cases, 
merely having done one's best is a state of affairs that it is valuable to bring about” (362). Given 
that I’m inclined to agree with this statement, I’ll drop the role of success in making a narrative 
meaningful. After explaining the terms that make a narrative meaningful, I argue that 
irreplaceability is not necessary for one’s chapter to be meaningful. Additionally, I provide an 
argument to show that events or non-projects can also make one’s narrative meaningful. Finally, 
 
 
I argue, by appealing to examples, that a meaningful narrative is necessary to increase one’s 
well-being. 
So, ultimately, according to Kauppinen, a meaningful narrative consists of projects that:  
a. are objectively valuable or valuable to other people 
b. i. are one’s own, ii. use one’s human capacities to achieve the goal, iii. irreplaceable 
c. positively change the agent  
The projects in one’s life include the goals that one has and the activities that one undertakes to 
reach those goals (359). When the project is objectively valuable, the project is valuable 
regardless of what anyone thinks about its value. That is different from when something is 
simply valued by others, which is when only others think the project has value (362). A project’s 
objective value can come from being valuable to others. Additionally, a meaningful narrative 
consists of projects that are one’s own where the goal of the project is not determined by internal 
or external forces (e.g. coercion), stems from one’s practical reasoning, and is “wholeheartedly 
embrace[d]” (361). Completing the project also needs to use one’s human capacities, such as 
one’s practical reason, emotional engagement, or physical effort (361). The project also needs to 
positively change the agent. While Kauppinen does not specify what a positive change involves, 
he uses the example of Martin Luther King’s life to illustrate a positive change. Martin Luther 
King’s first boycott positively changed him, since it “‘touched [King] indelibly—astonished, 
battered, broadened, and inflamed him’” (362). The example of Martin Luther King suggests that 
a positive change is a long term change. 
Since I object that irreplaceability is necessary for a narrative to be meaningful, I will 
first interpret the term as Kauppinen uses it. While he does not explicitly explain what 
irreplaceability means, he does offer a suggestive example about the meaning of irreplaceability 
 
 
where a handmade wooden assault rifle from a parent will have more significance than if the 
wooden assault rifle was given by a stranger (364). Moreover, he writes that “if anyone could 
replace [the individual in question],” one’s life would not be meaningful (353). In this case, the 
parent’s role in giving the gift cannot be replaced by another person to get an equally valuable 
result. Thus, based on the example above, according to Kauppinen, irreplaceability refers to how 
one’s role in completing a project cannot be substituted by another person, since no other person 
would be an equally worthy substitute to complete the project. 
 However, a person being irreplaceable to the success of a project is not necessary for a 
meaningful narrative, since a narrative of being a participant and being one part of a project can 
still be meaningful. Even when a project is central to our lives, we may not play the greatest role 
in the success of those projects. If one were part of a relay race or competition and one was the 
slowest person on the team, one would be replaceable in that another, faster person could be part 
of the team and would add more value to the project of winning the race. Even if the team wins 
the race, on Kauppinen’s principle for a meaningful narrative, the narrative of being a not-super-
important team player would not be meaningful. Similarly, if one centers one’s life around social 
justice by protesting with thousands of other people, one would be replaceable in that other 
protestors could stand in for the individual protestor. Kauppinen’s principle would have to claim 
that being one anonymous protestor in a large group and having a small contribution to a project 
could not make for a meaningful narrative. However, intuitively, contributing to a project and 
being a part of the project’s successes, such as by being a member on a team, can be the source 
of a meaningful narrative. Intuitively, a narrative championing for and contributing to social 
justice is meaningful. Thus, it is not the case that one must be irreplaceable for one’s narrative to 
be meaningful. While I reject that irreplaceability is necessary for a meaningful narrative, the 
 
 
other conditions proposed by Kauppinen are necessary and together sufficient for a narrative to 
be meaningful.  
 While Kauppinen does not talk about how non-projects can contribute to the meaning of 
one’s narrative, my view is that an event can contribute to the meaning of one’s narrative 
irrespective of his conditions. Sometimes, the narratives in our lives are not entirely determined 
by the individual’s actions and wishes, yet they can still be meaningful narratives. A meaningful 
narrative without a project is evidenced by the case of a narrative of unexpected reconciliation. 
In the scenario of unexpected reconciliation, we can take two close friends who have a falling 
out, mutually decide not to be friends anymore, and move on. One day, one friend unexpectedly 
apologizes and decides to put the past behind her. The two friends reconcile and rebuild their 
friendship. This narrative of unexpected reconciliation does not involve a project, since the 
friend who did not apologize had moved on and did not have the goal or even desire initially to 
reignite the friendship. Even though the first friend who did not reach out did not have the goal 
of reigniting the friendship, now the narrative that involves her friend is about a repaired 
relationship. Nonetheless, intuitively, such a narrative is meaningful, since it involves 
forgiveness and reconciliation. So, a project is not the only way that a narrative can be 
meaningful, the content of one’s narrative can involve one’s relationships and accidental events.  
 After rejecting one of Kauppinen’s necessary conditions for a meaningful narrative and 
adding that events can make for a meaningful narrative, I will argue that a meaningful narrative 
is necessary to increase one’s well-being by appealing to examples. For example, a narrative is 
meaningless when it consists solely of repetitive tasks, and that narrative does not increase one’s 
well-being. We can imagine a life where one’s activities and projects almost exclusively involve 
filing papers and watching tv shows and commercials. Crucially, this narrative of dullness is a 
 
 
meaningless narrative, given that the projects in the individual’s narrative are not objectively 
good and do not require very many human capacities. In such a case, one’s narrative would be 
one of dullness and intuitively, such a narrative does not contribute independently to one’s well-
being. The well-being that currently exists in the individual's life only comes from the well-being 
of the moments. Thus, this narrative fails the principle that a narrative must be meaningful to 
positively contribute to one’s well-being. It is not meaningful and thus, does not contribute to 
one’s well-being. 
 Similarly, a narrative that is determined entirely by another person is one that is 
meaningless and hence, does not increase one’s well-being as a whole. When the projects in an 
individual’s life are determined by another person, such as one’s parents, and one does not give 
any thought to whether the project is good or whether one should undergo the project, the 
projects in one’s life are not one’s own. We can take the example of a narrative that involves the 
project of attending medical school. However, the project was undertaken solely on the basis of 
one’s culture and one’s parents. For a project to be one’s own, it requires that one has acted on 
the basis of one’s own evaluative judgments. So, this narrative is not self-determined and fails to 
meet Kauppinen’s criteria for a meaningful narrative. And, intuitively, a narrative where one has 
not thought about or sufficiently engaged with the reasons for doing the project does not 
contribute additionally to the value already in one’s life. Again, in this example, one’s narrative 
is not meaningful and does not add to the total value in one’s life. 
 With examples of meaningless narratives and the intuition that they do not increase one’s 
well-being as a whole, the contrapositive is also the case; narratives that are meaningful do 
increase one’s well-being as a whole. One example of a meaningful narrative is a narrative of 
acceptance and self-discovery, such as when an individual accepts oneself as LGBTQ+ after 
 
 
years of being in denial of one’s sexuality. Eventually, after finding support in others, in this 
case, one decides to come out on one’s own terms. Intuitively, such a narrative increases one’s 
well-being as a whole. Of note is that such a narrative not only increases the total value in one’s 
life but also meets my principle by being a meaningful narrative. Even though this narrative does 
not necessarily involve a project, when it is one’s project to accept oneself and come out, it 
meets Kauppinen’s conditions for a meaningful narrative. The coming out narrative I have 
specified involves a project that is objectively valuable for its own sake and because one gains 
self-knowledge. Moreover, in this case, undertaking the project of coming out is one’s own, 
since it is of one's own volition to share this aspect of oneself with one’s friends and family. One 
was not forced to undertake this project. This project also involves the human capacities of 
having self-awareness, questioning one’s internalized beliefs, and exercising compassion for 
oneself during the slow process, among other capacities. Finally, even if one’s relationships are 
negatively affected in the process, this coming out narrative positively changes the agent and 
outweighs the negative changes, since one feels better about oneself by accepting oneself and 
one finds community with other LGBTQ+ individuals. So, through examples, I have argued a 
meaningful narrative is necessary for a narrative to increase one’s well-being. 
Section IV: Conclusion 
In Section IA, I began by explaining the debate about which things increase or decrease a 
person’s well-being. Afterwards, I assume that some things increase one’s well-being, even if 
one neither desires it (or would desire it) nor believes it is not good for one. That is, I assume that 
some things are good for someone objectively. After explaining the predominant theories of 
well-being, in Section IB, I present and ultimately reject Helena de Bres’s argument of how 
narratives that are true and adhere to a set of salient narrative conventions are objective goods, 
 
 
since I argue that they only increase one’s well-being instrumentally or indirectly. I then 
complete Section I by presenting David Velleman’s argument that the narrative of a person’s life 
is one of these objective things that can increase or decrease one’s well-being. I also respond to 
Johan Brännmark’s denial of the existence of momentary well-being and consequently, his 
denial of Velleman’s thought experiment for narrative value. The rest of the thesis is focused 
around how a narrative can positively contribute to one’s well-being. In Section IIA, I explain 
Rosati’s description of a narrative and point out some of its limitations. In Section IIB, I then 
present her conditions that a narrative must be chosen or internalized, affirming, and making 
one’s failings nearly irrelevant to increase one’s well-being. I then add the condition of truth as 
necessary for a narrative to positively contribute to one’s well-being. Finally, in Section III, I 
briefly explain what meaningfulness involves and use part of Kauppinen’s account of a 
meaningful narrative to argue that a narrative needs to be meaningful in order to increase one’s 
well-being as a whole. While I accept most of his criteria for a meaningful narrative, I reject that 
one needs to be irreplaceable for one’s narrative to increase one’s well-being and show that non-
projects can make for meaningful narratives as well. 
 In this thesis, I have explored whether and how one’s narrative can increase one’s well-
being and what criteria are necessary for one’s narrative to make a positive contribution to one’s 
well-being. As one’s narrative is one of the things that can increase one’s well-being, aiming for 
a good narrative can be something worthwhile to pursue. Even when one’s life is going badly 
and one’s efforts are not paying off, there can be another reason to persist– one may eventually 
come away with a good narrative. As the debate on narrative value continues, one can look to 
assess which common narrative tropes meet the necessary conditions to increase one’s well-
being. One can also analyze how narratives that increase one’s well-being actually apply to 
 
 
people. Helen Small has suggested that a narrative of progress is limited to few people given that 
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